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ABSTRACT
The security of TLS depends on trust in certificate authorities, and
that trust stems from their ability to protect and control the use of a
private signing key. The signing key is the key asset of a certificate
authority (CA), and its value is based on trust in the corresponding
public key which is primarily distributed by browser vendors. Com-
promise of a CA private key represents a single point-of-failure that
could have disastrous consequences, so CAs go to great lengths to
attempt to protect and control the use of their private keys. Nev-
ertheless, keys are sometimes compromised and may be misused
accidentally or intentionally by insiders. We propose splitting a
CA’s private key among multiple parties, and producing signatures
using a generic secure multi-party computation protocol that never
exposes the actual signing key. This could be used by a single CA
to reduce the risk that its signing key would be compromised or
misused. It could also enable new models for certificate generation,
wheremultiple CAswould need to agree and cooperate before a new
certificate can be generated, or even where certificate generation
would require cooperation between a CA and the certificate recipi-
ent (subject). Although more efficient solutions are possible with
custom protocols, we demonstrate the feasibility of implementing
a decentralized CA using a generic two-party secure computation
protocol with an evaluation of a prototype implementation that
uses secure two-party computation to generate certificates signed
using ECDSA on curve secp192k1.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The security of the web heavily relies on anchoring trust on the
certificate authorities. Although widely-trusted CAs take extraordi-
nary efforts to protect their private keys, compromises and abuses
still occur, with disastrous consequences. Roosa and Schultze [56]
discussed attacks on certificate authorities where the attacker either
takes control of the CA or colludes to obtain certificates trusted
by a client’s browser. As an example, an attack on Comodo’s reg-
istration authority (RA) allowed the attacker to obtain a domain
validation (DV) certificate for Google [58]. An attacker exploited a
subCA of DigiNotar to obtain several extended validation (EV) cer-
tificates [57]. EV certificates provide access to high security HTTPS
websites, and hence their leakage is more serious compared to the
leakage of DV certificates.
Certificate authorities are at risk of not just compromise, but
also internal misuse and mistakes. Notably, Symantec has issued
certificates without carefully verifying the domain and expira-
tion date or reviewing the certificate recipient’s application [48].
∗The first two authors both contributed as co-equal first authors.
In 2015, Symantec mistakenly issued test certificates for a num-
ber of domains, including www.google.com, without the permis-
sion of the domain holders. In response to suspicion that Syman-
tec has allegedly mis-issued more than 30,000 certificates, Google
Chrome recently announced plans on restricting certificates issued
by Symantec-owned issuers [27]. Free open certificate authority
Let’s Encrypt, which provides free certificates to requesters using
an automated domain validation protocol, has been criticized for
issuing TLS/SSL certificates to 15,270 sites containing the keyword
paypal.com which were obtained for use in phishing attacks [60].
The above attacks are possible due to single point-of-failure
where the certificate signature generation depends on a single pri-
vate key owned by a single CA. This key is stored in a physical
file that could be compromised by an outside attacker exploiting
software vulnerabilities, by an attacker who obtains physical access
to the stored key, or by insiders who have access to it within the
organization. Our goal is to provide a mechanism to reduce the
single point-of-failure risks inherent in current CAs. Our solution
is to split the private signing key into shares. The private key is
never reconstructed in any plaintext form. Instead, a new certifi-
cate is generated using a multi-party computation protocol where
the private key is only reconstructed in encrypted form within a
secure protocol. Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables
two or more parties to collaboratively compute a function with-
out revealing their individual inputs. We use MPC to enable a key
signing operation that depends on a private key, without ever ex-
posing that private key. The key itself is never visible to any party
in unencrypted form, and never stored on any physical device.
The shares could be distributed among multiple hosts operated
by the same CA to mitigate the risk of compromise when one of
the keys is stolen. To further reduce mistakes and insider risks, the
shares could be distributed across two independently-operated CAs
with their own procedures of vetting so that scrutiny from multiple
parties would reduce the chance of mistakes such as those made by
Symantec [48] and Let’s Encrypt [60]. The final scenario supports
organizations that do not want to place their identity in the hands of
a CA. The private key is split between the CA and the organization,
requiring involvement of both parties to generate the joint public
key the first time and a new certificate at each subsequent signing.
This joint public key is signed by a pair of two independent CAs.
This design allows organizations to control the generation of any
certificate for their domain, and prevents a CA from issuing certifi-
cates to third-parties without the permission of the domain holders.
However, adopting our scheme would require some modifications
to the current certificate deployment model. For first two scenarios,
where the organization is not involved in its certificate signing, the
joint public key used in the signing can be baked into the client
browser to verify the certificate signature. For the third scenario,
where the organization is also involved in the signing, baking the
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joint key into the client browser can be expensive, as there could
be many such keys, one for each organization. We could employ
certificate transparency logs [39] and public key pinning [14] to
solve this problem. Further discussion regarding this can be found
in Section 6.
In this work, we demonstrate the practicality of a decentral-
ized CA by implementing certificate signing as a secure two-party
computation using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) on a 192-bit curve. Although there are more efficient ways
to perform multi-party ECDSA signing as a specific protocol (see
Section 7), we believe it is useful to see how feasible it is do to this
using a generic secure computation protocol. By using a generic
protocol, it is easy to adapt the signing to other protocols or to in-
corporate other computations such as policy checks in the signing
process, as well as to support a variety of privacy models. The main
cost of signing depends on the cost of bandwidth between the par-
ticipating CAs. If both are in the same data center where in-center
bandwidth is free, the computational cost to sign one certificate
on Amazon AWS EC2 c4.2xlarge nodes using Yao’s garbled circuits
protocol with semi-honest security is 28.2-32.6 cents; for active
security using dual execution, this cost approximately doubles to
63.3-65 cents. Performing the signing with dual execution involves
transferring 819.44 GiB, so at AWS prices for bandwidth this makes
the cost per certificate up to $17.07 for active security when nodes
are running in different data centers. Although this cost may be
prohibitive for some purposes, for others (e.g., Symantec currently
charges a $500/year premium for ECC over RSA/DSA certificate) it
is already economically viable.
Roadmap. We begin by providing a background on the certifi-
cate issuance process (Section 2.1), secure multi-party computation
(Section 2.3), and the ECDSA signing algorithm (Section 2.2). In
section 3, we explain the design of our decentralized certificate
authorities. Section 4 provides details on our implementation, fol-
lowed by the performance measurements in Section 5. Finally, we
end our paper discussing the adaptability of our design in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
This section provides background on how certificates are issued,
secure multi-party computation protocols, and the ECDSA signing
algorithm.
2.1 Certificate Issuance Process
Digital certificates are issued by trusted certificate authorities for
certificate recipients (more formally referred to as subjects) who
wish to establish a secure connection with the clients visiting their
web page. Here, we provide some background on the contents and
format of X.509 digital certificates used in TLS, and the process
followed to issue a certificate.
X.509Digital Certificates. The standard format of TLS/SSL public
key certificates is X.509, which is made up of three components: (1)
the certificate, which contains information identifying the issuer
and the subject and the scope of the certificate (version number and
validation period), (2) the certificate signature algorithm specifying
the algorithm that was used for signing, and (3) the certificate
signature [16]. Whereas verifying the parameters of the certificate
component (1) is important in our decentralized CAs set up, our
primary goal is to compute the certificate signature (3) using a joint
signing process where the signing key is never exposed.
SubjectRequests for aCertificate. In the current X.509 setup, the
subject must apply for a certificate through submitting a Certificate
Signing Request (CSR) [64]. The first time the subject requests a
certificate, it generates a public-private key pair, including the
public key in the CSR and using the private key to sign the CSR.
Note that this key pair and signature is different from the CA’s key
pair and certificate signature that must be generated using the CA’s
private key. The subject’s signature provides a consistency check
that allows the CA to verify the CSR signature with the subject’s
provided public key.
Verifying the Subject’s Identity. Today, attesting to the appli-
cant’s CSR contents has become increasingly automated through
ad hoc mechanisms, though manual effects still remain. Through
the open-source automatic certificate management environment
(ACME) (as used by Let’s Encrypt), the applicant can prove its own-
ership of the domain by responding to a series of server-generated
challenges (i.e., proving control over a domain by setting a specific
location on its website to an ACME-specified string) [28]. ACME
allows certificates to be issued at a lower cost, but the lack of
manual scrutiny allows phishing websites, for instance, to obtain
certificates for popular domain look-alikes, which happened with
paypal.com [60]. It also only attests to having (apparent) control
of the domain at the time of the request, but does not provide any
way to verify that it is the legitimate owner of that domain or a
trustworthy organization.
The attestation process for proprietary CAs is not as publicly
known as ACME, and often includes non-automated steps. One
of the manual validation steps completed by Comodo is a phone
call to a number verified by a government or third party database,
or by legal opinion or accountant letter. This extra manual effort
both would have prevented the paypal.com incident and stopped
an attacker with a stolen CSR private key and access to the victim’s
server from obtaining a certificate.
Certificates designated as Extended Validation (EV) involve more
extensive validation. In order to issue EV certificates, a CA must
pass an independent audit [13] and follow defined criteria in issu-
ing certificates including verifying the subject’s identity through a
stricter, manual vetting process that includes both the Baseline Re-
quirements and the Extended Validation requirements [66]. Major
browsers display the padlock and green address bar for EV certifi-
cates. This conveys a higher level of security to customers, and CAs
charge subjects a premium to obtain them.
CA signs the Certificate. After verifying the subject’s identify
and validity of the request, the issuer composes the (1) certificate.
Although we colloquially refer to the issuer’s role as simply ‘signing
a certificate’, the technical term for the input to the signature algo-
rithm is the TBSCertificate, which is actually the (1) certificate. The
TBSCertificate is very similar to the CSR. But, whereas the CSR only
contains information about the subject, the TBSCertificate contains
pertinent information about both the subject and issuer. The output
to the signature function is the (3) certificate signature. In the rest
of the paper, we frequently use the terms signature generation and
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certificate generation interchangeably to mean the process whereby
a signed certificate is created from the TBSCertificate contents.
2.2 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDSA is a popular certificate signing algorithm that is included
with most TLS libraries including OpenSSL and GnuTLS, and is
supported by major web browsers includingMozilla Firefox, Google
Chrome, Internet Explorer, Safari and Opera.
ECDSA depends on modular arithmetic operations on elliptic
curves defined by the equation
y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b mod p
The curve is defined by three parameters: p, a large prime defining
the curve finite field Fp , and the coefficients, a and b. The size of
the parameters defines the size of the elliptic curve. NIST specifies
curves recommended for ECDSA with 192 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits
and 512 bits [53].
Signing depends on three additional public parameters as defined
by Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) [15]: G is
the base point of the curve, n is the order ofG , and h is the cofactor.
All the parameters are of same size as p.
Signing requires a private-public key pair (sk,pk). The private
key sk is chosen uniformly randomly from the range [1,p − 1], and
the corresponding public key pk is obtained from the curve point
multiplication pk = sk ×G.
Signing begins with generation of a uniform random number, k ,
in the range [1,p − 1], which is used to obtain a curve point (u,v)
= k ×G. One part of signature is r = u mod n. At this stage, if r
is 0 (which should happen with negligible probability), then the
whole process is repeated with freshly generated random number
k . The other part of signature is s = k−1(z + rd) mod n, where d is
the private key used for signing and z is the hash of the message to
be signed. Again, a check is performed to verify that s is not 0. If it
is, the process is repeated with freshly generated random number
k . Otherwise, the final pair (r , s) is the signature, which is made
public.
2.3 Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure multi-party computation enables multiple parties to col-
laboratively compute a function on their private inputs without
revealing any information about those inputs or intermediate val-
ues. At the end of the protocol, the output of the computation is
revealed (to one or more of the parties). We limit our focus here
to two-party computation because it fits our problem setting well,
although several methods exist for extending multi-party com-
putation to more than two parties. Two-party computation was
introduced by Yao [68], and he presented a generic method for
computing any function securely using garbled circuits in a series
of talks in the 1980s that is now known as “Yao’s protocol”. The
protocol enables any function that can be represented by a Boolean
circuit to be computed securely.
In a standard Yao’s protocol execution, one party, known as
the generator, generates the garbled circuit that computes over
encrypted inputs and passes it to the other party, known as the
evaluator, who evaluates the circuit by plugging in the encrypted
inputs. Instead of operating on semantic values, the garbled circuit
operates onwire labels, random nonces that provide no information,
but allow the evaluator to evaluate the circuit. The evaluator obtains
the wire labels corresponding to her own inputs using an oblivious
transfer protocol [22], and extended OT protocols enable large
inputs to be transferred efficiently [29, 33, 49, 51]. The output of
the computation is revealed to the parties at the end of the protocol,
typically by providing hashes of the final output wire labels to the
evaluator, who sends the semantic output back to the generator.
Yao’s protocol provides security only against semi-honest ad-
versaries, which are required to follow the protocol as specified
but may attempt to infer private information from the protocol
transcript. It does not provide security against active adversaries
since there is no way for the evaluator to know she is evaluating
the correct circuit, and there is no way for the generator to ver-
ify the output provided by the evaluator is the actual output. A
malicious generator could generate a circuit that computes some
other, more revealing, function on the other party’s input, instead
of the agreed-to function. In our scenario, instead of outputting the
correct signature (which should not reveal the other party’s key
share), the circuit could be designed to output the other party’s key
share masked with a value known to the generator.
Hence, although semi-honest security can provide some protec-
tion by avoiding the need to store the key in a way that could be
exposed, is not sufficient for implementing a decentralized CA in
any adversarial context. The most common methods for harden-
ing MPC protocols to provide security against active adversaries
is to use like cut-and-choose [42]. In a standard cut-and-choose
protocol, the generator generates k garbled circuits and the eval-
uator chooses a fraction of the circuits and asks the generator to
reveal those circuits to test their correctness. The evaluator then
uses the remaining circuits for secure computation. Although there
have been many improvements to the basic cut-and-choose pro-
tocol [1, 2, 11, 25, 31, 36, 40, 43–46, 52, 55, 62, 63, 67], it remains
expensive for large circuits.
Dual execution. The alternative, which we explore in this work, is
to relax the strict requirements of fully malicious security to enable
more efficient solutions. In particular, we use dual execution [30,
47], which provides active security against arbitrary adversaries,
but sacrifices up to one bit of leakage to provide a much more
efficient solution. In a dual execution protocol, Yao’s protocol is
executed twice, with the parties switching roles in the consecutive
executions. Before revealing the output, though, the outputs of the
two executions are tested for equality using a malicious-secure
equality test protocol. The output is revealed to both the parties
only if the equality check passes. Otherwise, it is apparent that
one of the parties deviated from the protocol and the protocol is
terminated. A malicious adversary can exploit this to leak a single
bit that is (at worst) the output of an arbitrary predicate by using
selective failure—designing a circuit that behaves correctly on some
inputs but incorrectly on others, so the equality test check result
reveals which the subset of inputs contains the other party’s input.
We use Yao’s protocol in the case of semi-honest adversaries
and dual execution in the case of malicious adversaries. In the next
section, we discuss our signing algorithm and how we adopt these
protocols for our scenario.
3
3 DESIGN
Implementing a decentralized CA requires protocols for generating
a joint signing key (without ever disclosing the private key to any
party) and for signing a certificate using a split key. Both of these
protocols use secure multi-party computation to allow the two
hosts1 that are combining to implement a joint CA to securely
compute these functions while keeping their private inputs secret.
We assume that the two hosts have already agreed on the sign-
ing algorithm and public elliptic curve parameters (ECDSA in our
prototype implementation), and have decided on the methods they
will use to validate certificate requests. These methods can be inde-
pendent, indeed it is best if they are. All that is necessary is that
both participants must agree before any certificate can be signed
using the joint signing key.
Next, we present the key generation and signing protocols. Sec-
tion 3.3 provides a brief security argument. Section 3.4 discusses
different ways our protocols could be used.
3.1 Key Pair Generation
Before a pair of hosts can perform joint signings, they need to
generate a joint public-private key pair. This is a one-time process
and is independent of the certificate signing protocol. At the end
of this process, a joint public key is published and each host has
a share of the corresponding private key. The private key never
exists in any unencrypted form, so the only exposure risks are if
both hosts are compromised or the MPC protocols are corrupted.
Figure 1 illustrates the key pair generation protocol. To begin,
each host generates a random value that will be its private key
share: skA (owned by party A) and skB (owned by party B). These
are drawn uniformly randomly from the range [0,p−2]. The master
private key, sk = (skA + skB ) mod (p − 1) + 1, is in the range
[1,p − 1]. Because of the properties of modular addition, this key
will be uniformly randomly distributed in [1,p − 1], even if one of
the input keys is not. The private key, sk , is not revealed to either
of the parties and will only be represented by encrypted wire labels
inside the MPC signing protocol.
Within the MPC, the key shares are combined to produce sk
as described above, and the elliptic curve point multiplication is
performed to generate the public key pk = sk × G. This value is
revealed as the output to both the parties. Section 4.2 provides
details on how curve point multiplication is implemented, which is
used in both key generation and signing.
3.2 Signing a Certificate
Once a pair of hosts have generated a joint key pair, they can jointly
sign certificates using the shared private key without ever exposing
that key. The inputs to the signing protocol are the key shares (skA,
skB ), the random number shares (kA, kB ), and the message to be
signed, z. The key shares are those that were used as the inputs to
the key pair generation protocol to produce the joint key pair.
Each signing server generates an Ln-length random integer in
the range [0,p − 2] that will be its share of the random number k ,
1We use hosts in this presentation as a generic term for the participant in a protocol.
As we discuss in Section 3.4, in our case, the hosts could be separate servers operated
by a single CA, two separate servers operated by independent CAs, or independent
servers operated by a CA and a subject.
needed for ECDSA signing. These shares, kA and kB , are inputs to
the MPC protocol and will be combined to obtain k = (kA + kB )
mod (p − 1)+ 1 (which is uniform in the range [1,p − 1]) inside the
protocol so neither party can control k .
Both hosts must agree on the same TBSCertificate to be signed,
and use whatever out-of-band mechanisms they use to validate
that it is a legitimate certificate request. As specified by ECDSA,
the input to the signing function, z, is the Ln left-most bits of
Hash(TBSCertificate), where Ln is bit length of the group order
n [65]. Both parties compute z independently, and feed their input
into the MPC (these are denoted as zA and zB in Figure 2). There
is no secret involved in computing z, but it is essential that both
parties know and agree to the certificate they are actually signing.
Hence, both parties provide their version of z as inputs to the secure
computation, so there is a way to securely verify they are identical.
The signing algorithm first compares the inputs zA and zB to
verify that the two parties are signing the same certificate. Then, k
and sk are obtained by combining the shares from both the parties
as explained above. The remaining steps follow the ECDSA signing
algorithm mentioned in Section 2.2. At the end of the protocol, the
certificate signature pair (r , s) is revealed to both parties. In rare
instances, the signing algorithm may result in r = 0 or s = 0, in
which case the whole process is repeated by both the parties with
different values of kA and kB . To avoid any additional disclosure in
the dual execution model, however, it is necessary to complete the
signing process even when r = 0 and perform the secure equality
test on the result so there is no additional leakage opportunity for
an adversarial generator.
3.3 Security Argument
The above signing algorithm is implemented using both Yao’s pro-
tocol and dual execution. The security of our protocols follows
directly from the established security properties provided by the
underlying MPC protocols we use, so no new formal security proofs
are needed.
For semi-honest Yao’s protocol, which we do not recommend
but include in our cost analysis for comparison purposes, one party
acts as the circuit generator and the other party acts as the circuit
evaluator. The generator creates a garbled circuit encoding the
above signing algorithm and passes it to the evaluator along with
the wire labels corresponding to his inputs. The evaluator obtains
the wire labels for its inputs using extended oblivious transfer, and
gets the result of the computation. For instance, if party A is the
generator, then A passes the circuit along with the wire labels cor-
responding to kA, skA and zA to party B, who acts as the evaluator.
Party B obliviously requests the wire labels corresponding to kB ,
skB and zB from A, and evaluates the circuit, which first asserts
zA == zB . Revealing the assertion failure at this point leaks no
information, since it only depends on the non-secret z inputs. If
the assertion passes, it proceeds to obliviously combine the input
shares to compute the k and sk to be used in the signing. A sanity
check is also embedded to ensure that the shares kA, skA, kB and
skB are in the proper range (although a host that provides invalid
inputs would not obtain any advantage since they are combined
with the other host’s random shares using modular arithmetic).
The circuit computation finally outputs the signature pair (r , s), or
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Public Parameters: CURVE = (p, a, b, G, n, h), L
Party A Party B
skA ← {0, 1}L skB ← {0, 1}L
⟨skA ⟩ MPC ⟨skB ⟩
sk ← (skA + skB )mod (p − 1) + 1
pk ← sk ×G
pk pk
Figure 1: Protocol for generating key pair, GenerateKeyPair: skA; skB → pk ;pk . Party A generates one share of secret key, skA, and
Party B generates other share, skB . The output of protocol is public key, pk , that pairs with sk = skA ⊕ skB .
Public Parameters: CURVE = (p,a,b,G,n,h), L
Party A MPC Party B
Inputs: tbsCertA , skA Inputs: tbsCertB , skB
zA ← Hash(tbsCertA) zB ← Hash(tbsCertB )
kA ← {0, 1}L kB ← {0, 1}L
⟨skA ⟩, ⟨kA ⟩, zA ⟨skB ⟩, ⟨kB ⟩, zB
assert (zA == zB )
k ← (kA + kB ) mod (p − 1) + 1
sk ← (skA + skB ) mod (p − 1) + 1
(u, v) ← k ×G
r ← u mod n
s ← k−1(zA + r ∗ sk ) mod n
r, s r, s
cert← cert(r, s) cert← cert(r, s)
Figure 2: Protocol for generating certificate signature, GenerateCertificateSignature: (skA,kA, zA); (skB ,kB , zB ) → (r , s); (r , s).
Party A generates one share of the random integers, kA, and Party B generates other random integer, kB . The output of protocol is certificate
signature, (r , s), signed with secret key shares skA and skB . At the start of this signing protocol, we assume that the two parties have already
agreed to issue the certificate and on the contents of it.
outputs an error message if either r = 0 or s = 0. The output is
revealed to both parties.
Since, the semi-honest protocol is not secure against malicious
adversaries, a malicious generator can manipulate the circuit to
produce a bad certificate (i.e., obtain signature for a different certifi-
cate than for the agreed-upon message z) or to leak bits of the other
party’s secret key shares in the output (which could still appear
to be a valid signature on z). An easy attack would be to generate
a few different valid signatures with low fixed values of k (which
could be done with small sub-circuits), and then select among these
in a way that leaks bits of the other host’s private key share.
For these reasons, we do not think it is advisable to perform
something as sensitive as certificate signing using only semi-honest
security. Instead, we use the dual execution protocol to provide
active security with a single bit leakage risk. With dual execution,
Yao’s protocol is executed twice with both the parties switching
their roles in the consecutive runs, i.e. if party A is the generator
in the first execution, it then becomes the evaluator in the next
execution. However, the main difference is that the output of both
the runs is revealed only after passing a maliciously-secure equality
test that ensures that the semantic outputs of both the executions
are identical. This ensures that neither of the parties deviated from
the protocols and, as a consequence, generated a bad certificate.
We use a maliciously secure extended OT protocol [33] to obtain
the inputs, so the only leakage possibility is the one-bit selective
failure predicate.
In some applications, the risk of leaking an arbitrary one-bit
predicate on private inputs would be severe. For our key signing
protocol, however, it is negligible. The best a malicious adversary
can do is leak a single bit of the other party’s private key share
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for each execution, with a probability of 12 of getting caught. The
signing algorithms used have sufficient security margins that leak-
ing a few bits is unlikely to weaken them substantially, and the
participants in a joint CA have a strong incentive to not be caught
cheating.
3.4 Scenarios
We consider using our decentralized CA in three different settings:
jointly computing the signature and public key by (1) a single CA
that wants to protect its own signing keys by distributing them
among its own hosts, (2) two independent CAs who want to jointly
mitigate the risks of key exposure or misuse, and (3) a CA and
subject who wants to protect itself from a CA generating rogue
certificates by being directly involved in the certificate signing
process.
The first two scenarios are identical technically, just differ in
the out-of-band processes that are used to validate a certificate
request. In the first scenario, the risk of key exposure is reduced
by never storing the key in a physical form in one place. The two
hosts with key shares can be placed in different locations, protected
by different physical mechanisms and people. The decision to gen-
erate a certificate is still made in a centralized way, and a single
organization controls both key shares.
In the second scenario, the two hosts are controlled by different
organizations. Each could implement its own policy and methods
for validating a certificate request. This reduces the risks of mistakes
and insider attacks since people in both organizations would need
to collude (or be tricked) in order for such an attack to succeed. By
agreeing to a joint signing process, the two organizations could
also enter an agreement to share liability for any inappropriate
certificates signed by the joint key.
In the third scenario, the subject, S , holds the power to creating
its own certificate by owning a share of the private key that is used
to generate the signature. The subject and CAA first jointly create
a public key using the key generation protocol. In order of this
newly generated public key to be trusted, a certificate is needed
that vouches for this public key as part of a key pair which is jointly
owned by CAA and S . To support decentralization, this certificate
should be signed by a joint CA comprising two different CAs, CAB
and CAC . Both S and CAA will make independent requests toCAB
and CAC to sign a joint certificate that associates the generated
pk with subject (S,CAA). After validating these requests, CAB and
CAC will perform a joint signing protocol to generate a signed
certificate that attests to pk being the public key associated with
the joint (S,CAA) entity. With this, S and CAA can jointly produce
a new certificate that attest to a new key pair, which is validated by
the certificate chain from the joint (CAB ,CAC ) certificate authority.
For this scenario to add value, it is important that browsers trust
the joint root key of (CAB ,CAC ), but not fully trust the root key
of CAA (otherwise, CAA could still generate its own certificates
attesting to S). (We discuss deployment issues further in Section 6.)
4 IMPLEMENTATION
For our multi-party computation, we utilize the Obliv-C frame-
work [70] that includes the latest enhancements to Yao’s garbled
circuits protocol [69] including garbled row reduction [50, 55], free
XOR [35], fixed-key AES garbling [8] and half-gates [71]. These
reduce the number of ciphertexts transmitted per non-XOR gates
to 2, while preserving XOR gates with no ciphertexts or encryption
operations. Apart from the Yao’s protocol [68, 69] for garbled cir-
cuits that is secure against semi-honest adversaries, Obliv-C also
implements the dual execution protocol [30] to provide security
against malicious adversaries. The Obliv-C framework compiles
an extended version of C into standard C, converting an arbitrary
computation into a secure computation protocol by encoding it
into a garbled circuit. It achieves performance executing two-party
garbled circuits comparable to the best known results, executing
circuits approximately 5 million gates per second over a 1Gbps link.
4.1 Big Integer Operations
Since Obliv-C is based on C, it naturally extends all the basic C
data types and the operations over them. However, ECDSA requires
computation over large curve parameters of size in the range of 192,
256, 384 and 512 bits. We use the Absentminded Crypto Kit [20],
which is built over Obliv-C framework, to support secure computa-
tion over arbitrarily large numbers. We implement ECDSA over the
standard NIST curve secp192k1 [15], although our implementation
can be easily adopted for any standard elliptic curve. While the
Absentminded Crypto Kit provides basic operations like addition,
subtraction, multiplication and division over arbitrarily large num-
bers, the ECDSA algorithm requires modular arithmetic operations.
Hence we are required to handle the underflows and overflows in
the intermediate computations, thereby increasing the number of
invocations of basic arithmetic operations over big numbers. This
impacts the overall computation cost (we discuss the cost of these
individual operations in Section 5, Table 2).
4.2 Curve Point Multiplication
The most expensive step in ECDSA (for both key generation and
signing) is the curve point multiplication protocol. In order to calcu-
latek×G efficiently, wherek is a positive integer andG is the elliptic
curve base point, we implement the double-and-add procedure (Al-
gorithm 1), which invokes the pointAdd and pointDouble subroutines
Ln number of times at the most, where Ln is the number of bits
of k . In comparison, a naïve curve multiplication procedure would
require k invocations of pointAdd, where k is a large value in the
range [1,p − 1], where p is the curve parameter of the order 2Ln .
Normally, the double-and-add procedure is prone to timing side-
channel attacks since the number of executions of the if block
reveals the number of bits set in k . Within an oblivious computation,
however, the actual value of the predicate is not known and all
paths must be executed obliviously. This means there can be no
timing side-channels since all of the executing code is operating
on encrypted values. In our implementation, this is made explicit
with the obliv if in Obliv-C, which must be used when the predicate
involves oblivious values. It obliviously executes both branches, but
ensures (obliviously) that the computation inside the block takes
effect only if the predicate was true.
The procedures pointAdd and pointDouble output the resulting
curve pointR, following the equations in Figure 3. All the operations
are modulo p, where p and a are the elliptic curve parameters
explained earlier. Here (Nx−Qx )−1 and (2Ny )−1 aremodular inverse
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Algorithm 1: Double-and-Add Based Point Multiplication
1 curveMult (k,G);
2 N ← G;
3 Q ← 0;
4 for bit position i ← 0 to Ln do
5 if ki = 1 then
6 Q ← pointAdd(Q,N );
7 end
8 N ← pointDouble(N );
9 end
10 return Q ;
pointAdd(Q,N )→ (Rx ,Ry ) pointDouble(N )→ (Rx ,Ry )
λ = (Ny −Qy ) × (Nx −Qx )−1 λ = (3N 2x + a) × (2Ny )−1
Rx = λ
2 −Qx − Nx Rx = λ2 − 2Nx
Ry = λ(Qx − Rx ) −Qy Ry = λ(Nx − Rx ) − Ny
Figure 3: Eliptive Curve Point Operations
operations, implemented efficiently using the Extended Euclidean
algorithm.
4.3 Dual Execution
In dual execution, the protocol must follow feed-compute-reveal
flow, such that all the inputs are required to be fed into the gar-
bled circuit in the beginning and only then the computation can
be performed, and finally the output is revealed in the end. This is
important to satisfy the requirements of the dual execution security
proof. Thus, it is not valid to feed in some input during the compu-
tation or to reveal any output before the completion of computation.
Hence, in the ECDSA algorithm, we cannot reveal to the parties if
r = 0 or s = 0while the computation is in progress. An exception to
feed-compute-reveal flow is the assertion of TBSCertificate hashes
generated by both the parties zA == zB in the beginning, where
both zA and zB are in plain text and hence are not part of the gar-
bled circuit computation. This allows us to break the computation
in case the assertion fails, and does not breach privacy since the
message hashes are public values.
5 COST
The goal of the cost evaluation is to understand the actual cost of
deploying a decentralized CA in different scenarios. Since latency
of key generation does not matter much, and it is easy to parallelize
MPC executions to reduce latency [12, 32], we focus our analysis
on the financial cost of operating a decentralized CA. Except in
cases where inter-host bandwidth is free, this cost is dominated
by bandwidth. We report results for signing only, since the key
generation task is less expensive than signing, and is only done
once for each key pair, where we expect many signings to be done.
Setup. Our experiments were performed on Amazon Elastic Com-
pute Cloud (EC2) using c4.2xlarge nodes with 15 GiB of memory
and 4 physical cores capable of running 8 simultaneous threads. We
selected c4.2xlarge nodes as they are the latest compute-optimized
nodes of AWS and have a dedicated EBS bandwidth of 1000 Mbps.
For the operating system, we used Amazon’s distribution of Ubuntu
14.04 (64 bit).
We implement the NIST elliptic curve secp192k1 [15], which
has 192-bit parameters. All the private and random keys shares are
192-bit numbers generated using C’s GNU MP Bignum Library [23]
(GMPLib). We use Obliv-C [70] for secure MPC and our garbled
circuit implementation uses 80-bit long cryptographic random wire
labels. Secure computation over the 192-bit parameters is done
using Absentminded Crypto Kit [20]. The hashing algorithm used
for our input to the signing algorithm is SHA256, and our TBSCer-
tificate is generated using OpenSSL [24] using a sample certificate
data that Symantec could have used to sign Google’s certificate.
Regardless of the data contained in the TBSCertificate, the SHA256
hashed TBSCertificate results in a 32-byte string that is later sub-
mitted to the signing function. The TBSCertificate appears in the
final certificate and is used by browsers to verify the signature. All
of the data are fed into the MPC as 8-bit integer arrays.
We evaluated the signing costs with three different scenarios of
servers/nodes based on the distance between them: Local, where
both the parties run MPC on same machine; Same Region, where
each party runs on separate machines in the same region (we used
US East – Northern Virginia) and Long Distance, where each party
runs on separate machines in different data centers; we used one
host in US East – Northern Virginia and the other in US West –
Northern California. This experimental setup helps us know to
what extent the decentralized certificate authority is practical when
the participating CAs are geographically separated.
Results. Table 1 summarizes the runtime measurements and cost
estimates for signings completed using both the semi-honest and
dual execution protocols for the three scenarios.
To simulate running a real server, the nodes were loaded with in-
creasing number of simultaneous signings until the lowest compute
time per signing was discovered. The compute time per signing
is the largest when the two servers are far from each other. We
measured the bandwidth between two EC2 nodes using iperf and
found it to be 2.57 Gbits/sec between two hosts in the same region
(US East - Northern Virginia) and 49.8 Mbits/sec between hosts in
US East – Northern Virginia and US West – Northern California
data centers.
The optimal setting for Local signing with Yao’s protocol was for
24 parallel signings, which took 17 hours to produce 24 signatures,
costing 28.2 cents per signing at the current AWS on-demand price
for a c4.2xlarge node of 39.8 cents per hour. Dual execution achieved
the best results at 16 parallel signings taking 25.5 hours to do so and
costing 63.3 cents per signing. For nodes in the same region, Yao’s
protocol performed the best for 32 parallel signings, taking 14.1
hours and costing 32.6 cents per signing. Whereas, dual execution
performed the best for 24 parallel signings, taking 19.6 hours and
costing 65 cents per signing. These results are as expected, since the
extra latency between the nodes means additional parallel processes
can take advantage of delays waiting for network traffic.
The cost of bandwidth within an AWS data center is free, so
for the Local and Same Region scenarios, only computation cost
matters. For cross-country signings, we found best latency results
with 72 parallel signings for Yao’s protocol and 40 parallel signings
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Local Same Region Long Distance
Yao DualEx Yao DualEx Yao DualEx
Optimal # simultaneous 24 16 32 24 72 40
Compute Time (hrs) 17.0 25.5 13.1 19.6 31.3 34.3
Duration (/signing) 0.708 1.59 0.409 0.817 0.435 0.858
Compute Cost ($/signing) 0.282 0.633 0.326 0.65 0.346 0.684
Data Transfer (GiB/signing) 409.72 819.44 409.72 819.44 409.72 819.44
Data Transfer Cost ($/GiB) 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.02
Total Data Transfer Cost ($/signing) 0 0 0 0 8.19 16.39
Total Cost ($/signing) 0.282 0.633 0.326 0.65 8.54 17.07
Table 1: Cost results. The results shown are for generating a signature with the ECDSA on the curve secp192k1 using Yao’s semi-honest
garbled circuits protocol and Dual Execution. For the Local execution, there is a single host executing both sides of the protocol. Same
Region uses two host in in the same EC2 region (US East); Long Distance uses one host in US East and the other in US West. Costs are rough
estimates computed based on current AWS pricing, $0.398 per hour for an c4.2xlarge Amazon EC2 node. Bandwidth charges can vary by
region, but are approximately $0.02/GiB at bulk transfer rates across regions within AWS.
for dual execution. The cost for this scenario is dominated by the
cost of bandwidth, since circuit execution requires transmitting
over 400 GiB of data. At AWS bulk transfer cost of 2 cents per GB
across different regions of AWS, the total cost per signing came as
$8.54 for Yao’s protocol and $17.07 for dual execution.
These costs seem high, and what AWS charges is probably an
over-estimate of what it would actually cost to do this at scale and
bandwidth costs vary substantially across cloud providers. Never-
theless, we believe they are already low enough for joint signing
to be practical for high-value certificates. For instance, Symantec,
which charges a $500/year premium for ECC over RSA/DSA cer-
tificate, could easily absorb such bandwidth costs in the margins
available for premium certificates, and compared to the human costs
of validating identities for EV certificates these costs are minor.
Cost Breakdown. The garbled circuit used for signing contains
21.97 billion gates. Since we use the half-gates technique as im-
plemented by Obliv-C, we need to send two 80-bit ciphertexts for
each gate (160 bits total). This amounts to 409.18 GiB of total data
transfer. The measured total bandwidth required for a signing is
409.72 GiB, indicating that all the other aspects of the protocol
(including the OT to obtain input wires, output reveal, and other
network overhead) are less than 0.54 GiB (<%0.132) of the total. The
data transfer overhead is approximately double for dual execution
protocol as it requires two rounds of Yao’s protocol execution.
Since the garbled circuit transfer dominates the cost of decentral-
ized signing, we break down the cost of its component operations
in terms of number of non-XOR gates and the bandwidth to transfer
them in Table 2. The multiplication and division operations over
the 192-bit parameters are much more expensive than addition
and subtraction. Then, multiplication and division operations make
the modular inverse expensive as it relies on these primitives. The
curve multiplication becomes expensive as it repetitively invokes
the other operations, and the 19.2 Billion gates needed for this ac-
count for nearly the entire cost of the protocol, hence are the best
target for optimization efforts.
Signing across Cloud Services. In most important scenarios, the
certificate authorities would not want to rely on a single cloud
Operation # of Gates Bandwidth (in MiB)
Addition 1500 0.03
Subtraction 1500 0.03
Multiplication 101 000 1.93
Division 376 000 7.17
Modular Inverse 113 million 2155.30
Curve Multiplication 19.2 billion 366 210.94
Table 2: Complexity of individual operations over 192-bit pa-
rameters in Garbled Circuit protocol
service provider due to either trust or privacy issues or due to
having legal obligations to a specific service provider.We performed
experiments for signing between an AWS instance and an Azure
instance in the same region (US East), both with same configuration.
The cost to transfer data out of AWS service for the first 10 TB per
month is 9 cents per GiB [59], and for Azure it is 8.7 cents per
GiB [7]. The bandwidth between Azure and AWS US East nodes is
1.29 Gbits/sec, and the local runtime for an Azure node is similar
to that of the Amazon node. We found that the Yao’s protocol
obtained the same optimal settings as that of two AWS nodes in
the same region. For 32 simultaneous signings, Yao’s protocol took
14.1 hours in comparison to 13.1 hours for two AWS nodes in
same region. Thus, signing between Amazon and Azure nodes cost
around $37. Though we did not perform signing experiments with
dual execution due to cost constraints, we can estimate that running
a signing with dual execution across Amazon and Azure nodes
would cost around $74. Although the cost is higher than signing
within the same cloud platform, this scenario is still practically
feasible for professional certificate authorities that prioritize privacy
over cost and can probably obtain bulk bandwidth during low-
demand times at much cheaper rates than the costs we modeled.
6 DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated our decentralized certificate authority using
secure two-party computation with the signing algorithm ECDSA
on the curve secp192k1 as a proof-of-concept. The prototype can
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be expanded to work on positive curve parameters of any size
without any change to the code, and it would be straightforward to
implement other signing algorithms such as DSA this way (although
the actual practicality of implementing other algorithms within
an MPC would depend on the computation required). Below we
mention some suggestions and possible modifications for efficiency
and wider adaptability of our current scheme.
Other Security Models. Though we achieve secure two-party
signing in the presence of malicious adversaries, our dual execution
based signing costs double than that of Yao’s protocol based sign-
ing. An alternative would be to use the more efficient protocol of
Kolesnikov and Malozemoff [34], which provides a slightly weaker
notion of publicly-verifiable covert security, but is practical and
achieves efficiency close to that of semi-honest protocols. Covert
adversaries [6] can deviate from the protocol like malicious adver-
saries, but are caught by the honest party with a fixed probability.
Asharov and Orlandi [5] modified this definition by making the
detection of covert adversaries publicly verifiable, thereby mak-
ing this security notion more practical and widely applicable. This
scheme is improved upon by Kolesnikov and Malozemoff, making
it more efficient by replacing the original oblivious transfer [54]
in the scheme with the more efficient oblivious transfer extension
protocol [4]. The drawback of using this model, however, it is pro-
vides no limit on the leakage that might be obtained before the
adversary is caught. Without a strong revocation mechanism, this
would have a high risk in our application since a malicious host
could potentially obtain the other host’s key share, and generate
fraudulent certificates that would be trusted by browsers even if
the malicious activity is detected.
Extending to Three-Party Setting. Our work has focused on
the two-party setting, which we believe is simplest to deploy and
reason about. There are very efficient MPC protocols know for
three-party models where it is assumed that two of the parties are
honest. For example, Araki et al. [3] propose a three-party scheme
for distributed AES encryption and distributed ticket generation in
Kerberos in the presence of a corrupt/malicious party. Launchbury
et al. [37] and Laur et al. [38] also provide efficient implementa-
tions of distributed AES encryption with honest majority. Any of
these schemes could be used for extending distributed certificate
authority to three-party setting with an honest majority.
Deployment. In Section 3.4, we explained the setups for our de-
centralized CAs. Deployment of our designs would require some
out-of-band changes on the current certificate chain and its vali-
dation process. First, browsers would need to add a new class of
certificate, the joint validation certificate, analogous to the current
extended validation certificate (EV) (Section 2.1).
In the first scenario of a single CA signing the certificate inter-
nally, the only change that the CA would need to make is to submit
its new certificate to the browser. In the second scenario where two
individual CAs are involved, the joint signing key would need to
be trusted by the browser. Ideally, this could be a built-in root key
in the browser so there is no reliance on a separate root key. For
immediate deployment, however, it could be validated as part of a
certificate chain.
In the third scenario, each subject-CAs pair has their own set of
certificates. Since it would not be practical to include the certificate
for every subject-CAs pair in the browser, we could use alternative
measures to track subject-CAs certificates and ensure that CA-only
certificates for the subject will not be trusted. The first idea is to use
a certificate transparency log, where certificates are publicly logged
by CAs and browsers as they are issued and observed as to easily
audit and mitigate attempts of misuse [39]. A simpler solution is
public key pinning [14], which associates a host directly with its
certificate or public key before the deployment of the browser or
when the browser first encounters the host. Once a subject has
pinned its key using a subject-CAs certificate, it is protected with
this client from a certificate generated independently by the CA.
7 RELATEDWORK
We discuss existing works on distributing ECDSA signing, dis-
tributed certificate authority and multi-party AES computation
which are closely related to our problem.
Distributing ECDSA signing.We describe two alternative proto-
cols for distributed ECDSA signing. Threshold cryptography [19]
allows n parties to share the signing power so that any subset of
t + 1 parties can jointly sign. Many schemes for producing standard
digital signatures have been designed. Notably, Gennaro et al. [26]
proposed a threshold-optimal, distributed DSA/ECDSA signature
scheme that is fully compatible with the application of Bitcoin. This
scheme requires constant computation time and storage for each
party, taking around 13s to produce a signature.
Recently, Lindell [41] proposed a faster signature protocol for
ECDSA and DSA for the specific case of signing with two parties.
Their scheme is approximately two orders of magnitude faster
than the previous best, taking 37 ms for signing with curve P-256
between two single core machines.
Though these schemes are much more efficient than ours, they
are tailor-made to perform a specific signing protocol and hence lack
the flexibility of performing complex multi-party assertions, such as
the comparison of the hashed input messages of the two parties or
checking a CA-specific policy, during the certificate signing process.
Our scheme achieves this flexibility via the MPC protocol and hence
could be easily extended to compute any custom signing.
Distributing Certificate Authority. Decentralizing or distribut-
ing a certificate authority across many nodes is an idea first intro-
duced by Zhou and Haas [72] in 1999 when tackling the problem of
providing security for ad hoc, mobile networks where hosts relied
on each other to keep the network connected. This work proposed
spreading the functionality of a single certificate authority to a
set of nodes using secret sharing [61] and threshold cryptogra-
phy. Later, researchers such as Dong et al. [21] built upon this idea
and provided practical deployment solutions. Though we do not
consider mobile ad hoc networks, we attempt to solve the same
problem through secure multi-party computation [69].
AES with Multi-Party Computation.Multi-party computation
has been used in many works [3, 18, 37, 38] for joint AES com-
putation among multiple participants. Damgard and Keller [18]
implemented three-party MPC protocol using VIFF framework for
AES computation with honest majority for semi-honest adversary
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and achieved a block encryption in 2 seconds. The authors, however,
claim that their method can be strengthened by using passively
secure protocol [9] against dishonest majority or actively secure
protocol [17] against a third of corrupted parties. Launchbury et
al. [37] proposed a more efficient method for three-party AES en-
cryption in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, where they
replaced garbled circuits with look-up tables in the MPC protocol,
and achieved 300 block encryptions per second. Laur et al. [38]
implement multi-party AES with secret-shared key and plaintext
using Sharemind framework [10], and then apply join operation
over secret-shared tables in a database. Recently, Araki et al. [3]
gave the first practical implementation of AES encryption with
three-party protocol that provides security against semi-honest
adversaries, and also guarantees privacy against malicious adver-
saries with honest majority. This privacy guarantee is weaker than
security against malicious adversaries, in a sense, it only ensures
that the malicious adversary does not infer about input or output of
the computation, but can corrupt the computation, thereby affect-
ing the correctness of the computation. Nonetheless, their method
achieves 1 million AES operations per second. However, this work
interests us the most since it also implements distributed ticket-
granting ticket generation of Kerberos protocol under the same
privacy settings, which is similar to our application of distributed
certificate authority. Thus, extending the distributed certificate au-
thority to three-party setting by adopting the method of Araki et
al. is of particular interest, and is a motivation for future research.
8 CONCLUSION
Internet security depends crucially on certificates signed by trusted
CA keys. These private keys pose a single point of failure, and it
is essential to limit the risk that they are compromised or abused.
We have demonstrated as a proof-of-concept that secure multi-
party computation can be used to enable jointly-signed certificates
without ever exposing the private signing key. Our experiments
indicate that a decentralized CA is feasible and affordable today.
Availability
Our code is available under an open source license from:
https://github.com/hainali/decentralizedca.
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A ECDSA CODE IN OBLIV-C
Obliv-C framework is an extension of C and hence, the syntax of the
code remains the same, but with some Obliv-C specific keywords
and functions. The code snippet for ECDSA in Obliv-C is shown
below.
1 void signCertificate(void ∗ args) {
2 obig k_A, k_B, k, ...;
3 obliv uint8_t k_A_array[MAXN], k_B_array[MAXN], ...;
4
5 obig_init(&k_A, MAXN);
6 obig_init(&k_B, MAXN);
7 //... and so on
8
9 feedOblivCharArray(k_A_array, io−>k_A, MAXN, 1);
10 feedOblivCharArray(k_B_array, io−>k_B, MAXN, 2);
11 //... and so on
12
13 obig_import_opointed_be(&k_A, k_A_array, MAXN);
14 obig_import_opointed_be(&k_B, k_B_array, MAXN);
15 //... and so on
16
17 for (int i = 0; i < Z_LENGTH; i++) {
18 z_A[i] = ocBroadcastChar(io−>z_A[i], 1);
19 z_B[i] = ocBroadcastChar(io−>z_B[i], 2);
20 }
21
22 assert(compare(z_A, z_B, Z_LENGTH));
23 obig_import_pointed_be(&z, z_A, Z_LENGTH);
24
25 combine_shares(&sk, sk_A, sk_B);
26 combine_shares(&k, k_A, k_B);
27
28 curveMult(&R_x, &R_y, G_x, G_y, k, a, p);
29 obig_div_mod(&tmp, &r, R_x, n);
30 r_comp_result = obig_cmp(r, zero);
31
32 mult_inverse(&k_inverse, k, n);
33 obig_mul(&interim, r, sk);
34 obig_add(&interim, z, interim);
35 obig_div_mod(&tmp, &interim_mod, interim, n);
36 obig_mul(&interim, k_inverse, interim_mod);
37 obig_div_mod(&tmp, &s, interim, n);
38 s_comp_result = obig_cmp(s, zero);
39
40 revealOblivInt(&io−>RisZero, r_comp_result, 0);
41 revealOblivInt(&io−>SisZero, s_comp_result, 0);
42
43 for (int i = 0; i < r.digits; i++)
44 revealOblivChar(&io−>r[i], r.data[i], 0);
45
46 for (int i = 0; i < s.digits; i++)
47 revealOblivChar(&io−>s[i], s.data[i], 0);
48
49 obig_free(&k_A);
50 obig_free(&k_B);
51 //... and so on
52 }
Line 2 declares the ‘obig’ variables for storing curve parameters,
signing keys and message to be signed. ‘obig’ variables can store
any arbitrary length big numbers and support basic arithmetic op-
erations like addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. We
require ‘obig’ variables to store the 192-bit curve parameters for our
implementation of ‘secp192k1’. Line 3 declares ‘obliv’ variables
which are used to temporarily store the random number and key
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shares. Lines 5–7 initialize the ‘obig’ variables. The content of these
variables is not revealed to any party, unless revealObliv<Type>()
function is invoked explicitly. Lines 9–15 load the random number
and key shares from the two parties, such that kA is loaded from
party 1 and kB is loaded from party 2, and so on.
Before the certificate signing process begins, the hash of ‘tbsCert’
from both the parties are to be negotiated. Both the parties load
their hash values zA and zB in plain text (lines 17–19). Next, as-
sertion is done in line 22, where we compare that both the hash
values zA and zB are equal. The signing process continues only if
the assertion passes, otherwise the protocol is terminated. Next,
the private key shares and random number shares are combined
in lines 25 and 26. ECDSA certificate signing is performed in lines
28–38 according to Section 2.2. After the computation, we reveal to
both the parties if the r or s was zero (in lines 40 and 41), indicating
the parties to rerun the algorithm with different shares of kA and
kB . Finally, signature pair (r , s) is revealed to both the parties (lines
43–47), and this concludes the MPC protocol.
The same code can be easily switched between Yao’s proto-
col and Dual Execution protocol. In order to execute Yao’s pro-
tocol, ‘signCertificate()’ function is passed as an argument to
‘execYaoProtocol()’ function in a wrapper code. To run Dual Ex-
ecution, ‘signCertificate()’ function is passed as an argument
to ‘execDualexProtocol()’ function in the wrapper code.
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